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1. Introduction 
In the United States, health insurance for those under age 65 is typically provided through 
group plans purchased by employers from commercial insurers.  Health insurance is a complex 
multi-attribute service, so employers looking to buy insurance face a difficult shopping problem.  
Savvy purchasers must consider which of the many drugs their employees might use are in the 
insurer’s formularies, which local physicians are part of the insurer’s provider network, and what 
co-pays, fees, and deductibles apply to which pharmaceuticals, providers and services.  
Comparison shopping is made even more difficult by the fact that many aspects of insurance 
involve commitments to provide services under hard-to-anticipate contingencies.  Medical 
underwriting by insurers and the great profusion of insurance products raises administrative costs 
and increases the complexity of an employer group’s search for health insurance.
1 
Large and sophisticated employers can avoid many of these difficulties by “self insuring” 
and hiring insurers simply to administer their plans.  Smaller and less sophisticated firms 
generally do not self insure.  Instead they purchase products that provide both administrative 
services and insurance.  These “fully insured” employers, who make up approximately half the 
market, face a particularly daunting search process.  
In this paper we analyze the effects of search frictions on the functioning of health 
insurance markets.  Our study, which focuses on frictions in the “fully insured” market, has both 
a theoretical and empirical dimension.   
We begin our theoretical discussion in Section 2 by sketching a simple model of the 
search process for health insurance.  Our analysis emphasizes three closely related results.  First, 
the law of one price does not hold in frictional insurance markets.  Instead there exists an 
equilibrium distribution of premiums (for identical policies and employer groups) and in this 
equilibrium all premiums exceed the marginal cost of insurance.
2  Second, equilibrium is 
 
1   Woolhandler, et al. (2003) note that Seattle alone had 757 distinct health insurance products.  Our 
discussions with executives in the insurance industry suggest that this number is not atypical for 
metropolitan areas and may be conservative.  Recent experience with the new market for 
pharmaceutical insurance under Medicare part D illustrates well the tendency for health insurance 
markets to proliferate vast numbers of products (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
2   The idea that search frictions lead to price dispersion is of course familiar, and empirical work has 
found such dispersion in many markets.  One example in the insurance market is Brown and 
Goolsbee’s (2002) study showing significant search frictions in the term life insurance market prior to 2 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
characterized by turnover in insurer-policy holder relationships.  In an employer-based health 
insurance system some turnover is inevitable, of course, owing to individual job loss or change.  
The distinctive implication of our search framework is that there will be significant additional 
turnover in which entire groups of employees drop their current insurance because their 
employers seek (and find) less expensive plans.  Third, because prices exceed marginal cost, 
insurers have powerful incentives to engage in marketing activities to attract new clients.  
Indeed, the competition for new clients can create a marketing arms race between insurers that 
leads to excessive spending.   
The fact that frictions create powerful incentives for marketing is important because 
evidence suggests that these expenditures are quite high in the US commercial health insurance 
system.  A recent McKinsey report, for example, finds that private insurers in the U.S. spend 
$60B/year more than other OECD countries after adjusting for GDP per capita.  Of this excess 
spending, $34B is attributable to marketing and underwriting expenditures (Farrell, Jensen, Bob 
Kocher, Lovegrove, Melhem, Mendonca, and Parish, 2008, Exhibits 49 and 50, pages 74 and 
75).  Some of these expenditures are no doubt used for conventional types of product promotion, 
e.g. advertising campaigns, event sponsorships, and compensation of an internal sales force.  In 
addition, marketing expenditures take the form of commissions to insurance brokers.
3 Evidence 
suggests that commission payments to brokers are quite substantial in the fully-insured market 
segment.
4  This matters because fully insured employer groups often rely on the experience and 
 
advent of internet-based comparison shopping.  (Health insurance is, of course, a much more complex 
product than term life, making search all the more problematic.)  Frank and Lamiraud (2008) report 
evidence of significant price dispersion for homogenous products in Swiss health insurance markets. 
3   See Hall (2000a) for a careful discussion of these payment agreements in health insurance.  Jackson 
(2008) offers an overview of the wide-spread use of side-payments to brokers in many financial 
services industries, including insurance.  He observes that these payments often lead to poor outcomes 
for consumers, and he discusses different legal approaches taken to mitigate these adverse outcomes. 
Our analysis complements his by suggesting that the effect of these payments on markets will depend 
on the extent of search frictions. 
4   Litow (2006)uses proprietary data from the actuarial and health care consultancy Milliman to analyze 
administrative expenses in private insurance plans.  In the small group market (from which Litow 
excludes self-funded plans), he reports that administrative expenses total 21% of earned premiums.  In 
contrast, the mostly self-insured large group market has administrative costs totaling 11.5% of earned 
premiums.  Almost all this difference is due to commission payments – which are 8.5% of premiums 
in the small group segment compared to 1% in the large group segment.  No other category of 
administrative expenses approaches the size of commissions in the small group market.  For example, 3 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
contacts of insurance brokers to help them in their purchase decisions.  To the extent that 
commissions and other direct payments cause brokers to act as insurers’ external sales force, 
they introduce imperfections into the search process that are manifest as search frictions.
5 
In Section 3 we examine our model’s empirical predictions about turnover and price 
dispersion using three data sources: the Household Survey component of the Community 
Tracking Study (CTS), proprietary information from the enrollment records of a large regional 
insurer, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS).  
We observe high rates of health insurance turnover, roughly 20 percent per year on average, with 
markedly higher rates for fully insured employers.  Importantly from the perspective of our 
theory, roughly half of this turnover is due to cancellations by entire employer groups.
6  As for 
the dispersion in premiums, a considerable amount of price dispersion remains after controlling 
for variation in product features and employer characteristics.  We use this residual variation to 
estimate the extent of search frictions.  Our estimates suggest that search frictions are sufficient 
to transfer approximately 13.5 percent of the consumer surplus from policy holders to insurers.  
This amounts to a transfer to insurers of approximately $35.8 billion dollars in 1997. 
In Section 4 we employ our theoretical model to address two important policy issues—
the quality of care financed by insurers and the effect of a public insurance backstop option.  
First, we note that chronic diseases such as diabetes account for a large fraction of health care 
costs, and effective disease management requires investments in the present to prevent or delay 
 
non-commission marketing expenses and underwriting expenses each account for only 1.5% of 
premiums in small groups (and each account for 1% of premiums in large groups). See Table 5 in 
Litow (2006). 
5   Not all payments to brokers take the form of commissions.  Sometimes additional direct payments are 
made to brokers to bring in new clients (Hall, 2000a).  We found an example of these sorts of 
payments in a contract appended to a legal complaint.  The contract obligated the insurer to pay 
brokers a fixed dollar amount above regular commissions for each new member they brought in and 
penalties were assessed for brokers who failed to keep 90% of the insurer’s incumbent clients.  It 
would be hard for employers to become aware of the conflicts of interest created by this payment 
because the contract required confidentiality as a “material condition” and breaching confidentiality 
would result in forfeiture of payments to the broker (Exhibit 3 in CSAHS/UHHS-Canton Inc vs 
Aultman Health Foundation, 2007).  
6   High turnover rates between insurers and their policy holders are common knowledge among brokers 
and insurance companies, but this issue has received only limited attention from economists and health 
services researchers.  For exceptions see Beaulieu, et al. (2007), Fang and Gavazza (2007), Herring 
(2006) and Cunningham and Kohn (2000).      4 
 
                                                
complications in the future.
7  We find that the excess turnover induced by search frictions serves 
to reduce the private returns on these investments in future health, thereby reducing insurance 
quality along an important dimension.   
Second, we examine the market impact of a government-financed public insurance 
option.  We demonstrate that a public insurance option competing with private insurers can 
improve the efficiency of the market for private insurance.  More specifically, a publicly 
subsidized backstop option reduces distortions created by frictions.  These improvements stem 
from the fact that a moderately priced public option can displace the relatively small number of 
insurance policies located on the far right tail of the distribution of premiums.  Eliminating this 
tail has a ripple effect that reduces prices throughout the rest of the market, scales back the 
incentives that lead to excessive marketing costs, and reduces policy turnover.    
Section 5 provides concluding comments. 
2. A Simple Model of Search Frictions in the Market for Insurance 
Economic analyses of private sector health insurance markets frequently highlight market 
failures arising from moral hazard or adverse selection.  In this analysis we take a different 
approach, focusing on problems that result from search frictions, i.e., on the consequences of 
imperfections in the process by which employer groups are matched to insurers.
8 
In setting out our model, we make two important simplifying assumptions.  First, we 
restrict attention to two players—insurance companies that issue policies and employer groups 
who purchase them on behalf of employees.
9  Second, we assume that insurers offer a single 
homogeneous product.   
It may seem incongruous to assume product homogeneity while appealing to search 
frictions resulting in part from product variety and complexity, but this approach is common to 
most theoretical analyses of search frictions.
10  Intuitively, frictions make it hard for employers 
 
7   See Cebul, Rebitzer, Taylor and Votruba (2008) for a discussion of this issue. 
8   These three types of market failures are not mutually exclusive; indeed, adverse selection can itself be 
a cause of search frictions (Li, 2007).   
9   This starting point overlooks at least one other important player in the fully-insured commercial 
insurance market: the brokers who advise employers on which policies to purchase.  As discussed 
above, side payments to brokers sustain imperfections in the search process and so not much is lost by 
leaving them out of the discussion. 
10  This assumption appears, for example, in Burdett and Mortensen’s ( 1998) model, on which we base 5 
 
to identify the available policy best suited to the needs and preferences of their workforce.  The 
search problem is made additionally difficult because frictions give insurers limited market 
power and, as we will show, insurers use this power to adopt heterogeneous pricing policies:  
Some adopt high-price low-volume strategies while others adopt low-price high-volume 
strategies.  Our empirical investigation in Section 4 uses within-segment variation in premiums 
to make inferences about the extent of frictions and so, for the purposes of this paper, product 
homogeneity is a reasonable simplifying assumption.         
The objectives and behaviors of employer groups (“clients”) and insurers are quite 
simple: There are nc clients, who each seek to purchase insurance at the lowest possible price.  
We stipulate a reservation price, p
R, so at price p the current-period surplus is p
R – p.  If the client 
is unsuccessful in fielding an offer, the surplus is normalized to 0.
11  Clients always accept the 
lowest price offered by competing insurers. 
There are nf  firms offering insurance, each of which is small relative to the market.
12  
The marginal cost of providing insurance is c.  Each firm adopts a strategy of choosing some 
price  p>c and then maintaining that price indefinitely—for current clients and any future clients.  
The firm also chooses a level of marketing/sales effort, x.  This effort is intended to promote 
one’s products and increase market share; we give additional details below.  Firms choose p and 
x so as to maximize profits.  In equilibrium, price offers will differ across insurers, resulting in a 
price distribution whose cumulative density is designated F(p).  Because clients are more likely 
to accept low price insurance than high price policies, the distribution of accepted offers differs 
from the distribution of offers.  We designate the cumulative distribution of accepted offers to be 
G(p). 
                                                                                                                                                             
our analysis below. 
11   One might think of the “no offer” outcome as going without insurance.  Alternatively, employers with 
no offer in the preferred market segment condition might take up “limited benefit” policies that cover 
only a narrow subset of hospital or other expenses (Abelson, 2009).   Finally firms without offers may 
ask employees to use backup coverage established by public policy, e.g., Medicare, health care at 
public clinics, or treatment at emergency departments as required by law for those with no 
demonstrated means of paying. 
12  Price dispersion can persist in friction oligopolistic markets as well (Stahl, 1989), but as this 
assumption makes clear, oligopoly is not necessary for the result. All agents have the same discount rate, r, which we set to 0 for expositional ease.  Agents 
are infinitely lived and the market unfolds in continuous time.  To derive the equilibrium 
distribution F(p) we use Burdett and Mortensen’s ( 1998) matching mechanism: All clients are 
assumed to receive offers drawn at random from the set of insurers, i.e., from F(p).  If there were 
no cross-insurer variation in marketing, the arrival rate of offers would be the same from each 
insurer, say λ.  Here, however, we allow for the possibility that λ varies, depending on insurer 
marketing efforts.  Matches occur as clients choose the lowest offered price, and the matches 
persist until the client exits.  Exits happen in one of two ways: (i) via an exogenous shock that 
occurs with probability, δ , or (ii) via a match with another insurance company offering a better 
deal. 
Insurers maximizes profit, which in the steady state is given by  
(1)  (,) ( )(, ,) () . p xp c n p F x m x π =− −  
The first term on the right-hand side gives the insurer’s surplus per client times the number of 
clients, , purchasing the product.  The number of clients purchasing a policy depends on where 
the insurer’s price, p, sits in the distribution of premiums, F, and on marketing efforts, x.  
Marketing is an important and costly activity in frictional markets and so we introduce the 
function,  , representing “marketing and sales” expenses associated with marketing activity.     
n
() mx
Ceteris paribus the optimal level of marketing might be expected to depend on the price 
the insurer has chosen, so we allow x to be a function of p.  The average level of marketing 
activity for competing insurers in a market, X, is  
(2)  () () . X xpd Fp =∫  
Following Manning (2003), we assume that the arrival rate of contacts for any individual insurer 
depends on x/X, the ratio of a firm’s marketing activity to the marketing activity of the average 
firm.  The aggregate rate at which offers arrive to clients in the market, λ, is assumed to be an 
increasing, concave function of the average marketing level chosen by insurers, X.
13   
In this framework the arrival of clients to an insurer charging premium  p is 
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13  See Chapter 3 of Manning ( 2003).  Like Burdett and Mortensen, his application is labor markets; he 
considers firms’ efforts to recruit employees. (3)  (,) ( ) ( 1 ) [ 1 () ], []
x
Apx XN u u Gp
X
λ ⎡⎤ =+ − − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 
where N is the ratio of clients per insurer (nc/nf), u is the proportion of clients who receive no 
offers, and G(p) is the distribution of accepted insurance premiums.
14  Similarly, the fraction of 
clients departing from an insurer charging premium, p, is  ()( ) , X Fp δ λ +  the exogenous rate 
plus the arrival rate of offers multiplied by the fraction of such offers that are less than one’s own 
price.  So the number of departures is 
(4)  () [ ( )() ](,,) Dp XFpnpFx δ λ =+ . 
 In steady state, the arrival of clients equals the departure of clients, so we can easily solve for 
 from (3) and (4):   (,,) npFx
(5) 










⎡⎤+− − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ =
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Given (5), the firm’s profits (1) can be written  
(6) 
() ( 1 ) [ 1 ( ) ] ( )
(,) () .
()( )










 We note for future reference that  must be convex, else profit increases in () mx xwithout bound.  
Also, we note that (6) can be written  




π =Π−  
where  () p Π is the term in brackets from (6).  Expression  () p Π  is independent of an insurer’s 
choice of x, so (7) implies that the optimal marketing expenditures, x*, is an increasing function 
of  () p Π .   
Equilibrium requires that expected profits in (7) be the same for all price and marketing 
strategies adopted by insurers.  Because x* is an increasing function of  () p Π , equal profits 
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14  Equation (3) assumes that all individuals who are outside of the desired insurance market segment, i.e. 
those who are uninsured or underinsured, will accept any offer of insurance that comes their way so 
long as it is priced below the reservation premium.  Those who already have insurance will accept 
only offers with premiums lower than their current premium.  This happens with probability 1-G(p). occur only if  () p Π is the same for all offered prices.
15  But if  () p Π is invariant to price, so then 
is an insurer’s optimal level of marketing activity, x*.  Thus in equilibrium each insurer chooses 
the same level of marketing x* = X (which in turn also means that marketing costs per client are 
higher in high-price firms than in low-price firms).      
We turn, finally, to the determination of equilibrium pricing.  In the insurance context, as 
in the Burdett and Mortensen’s ( 1998) original labor market analysis, equilibrium requires that 
the distribution of offered prices, F(p) is shaped so that insurers located anywhere on the 
distribution earn equal expected profits.  Intuitively, if there were “too many” insurers offering a 
price below a given p, the offer at p would not attract enough clients and so expected profits 
would be “too low.”  Conversely, if too many other insurers are offering a price above p, then the 
offered price would generate excess profits.   
The detailed steps to deriving the equilibrium distributions of offered prices, F(p), is 
presented elsewhere, so we omit algebraic steps.
16  We note, first, that the proportion of clients 









Next, it is easy to show that  










        
.   
Substituting (8) and (9) into (6), one can solve for the distribution F(p) that insures equal 
expected profits at any point on the distribution  
                                          
15  Suppose, to the contrary, that two firms had differing levels of Π, say  12 Π <Π .  Let 
*
1 x  be the 
optimal level of x  for firm 1.  Clearly, firm 2 would earn more profit than firm 1 even if it also set x 
to 
*
1 x , and since
* x  is increasing in  , it can make more profit yet by setting  Π x higher.  In short, 
profit will be the same for the firms only if Π is the same for the firms. 
16  See Mortensen ( 2003) or Manning ( 2003) for clear expositions. (10) 
1
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  Using (11), we can show that the premium at any quantile, θ , of the accepted price 
distribution  is found to be a weighted sum of marginal cost c and the reservation value p
R:   () Gp
(12)  pθ =c+ α(θ)[p
R-c],        
with weights α(θ) = (γ/(γ + 1 - θ))
2, where we have defined γ = δ/λ.  This last parameter is the 
“market friction parameter.”  Ceteris paribus the greater are the market frictions, i.e., the higher 
is γ, the larger the fraction of surplus accruing to insurers at every point on the distribution of 
accepted offers below p
R. 
The maximum premium in the accepted distribution of prices is found by setting 1 θ =  in 
equation (12).   Not surprisingly, the maximum accepted price equals the client’s maximum 
willingness to pay,  p
R.  Similarly, the minimum price in the distribution occurs when 0 θ = .  
From (12) we see that this minimum premium exceeds as long as there are some market 
frictions, i.e., as long as
c
0 γ > .  Thus even for insurers at the bottom of the price distribution, 
adding an additional client is always profitable.
17   Equation (12) also indicates that the entire 
distribution of prices depends on the highest prices clients will bear.  This feature implies that 
prices and incentives throughout the market depend on the prices chosen in the far right tail of 
the distribution of prices.  We will make use of this feature in the policy discussion in Section 4.2 
below. 
Using (11) we can also show that the average price observed in the market is  
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17  Of course, a firm’s profits might nonetheless be zero, given additional expenses for sales, marketing, 
arrangements for specialized contracts with clients, client screening costs, etc. (13)  ()
1






Intuitively, at low values of γ offers arrive relatively quickly, so market prices move closer to 
marginal cost.  Indeed, as γ approaches 0 the distribution of prices collapses to marginal cost c.  
Conversely, markets become increasingly frozen by frictions as γ  moves towards infinity and, in 
the extreme case, the distribution collapses around the maximum willingness to pay for 
insurance, 
R p . 
Three important implications of the model merit emphasis: 
First, the model leads us to expect price dispersion in a market characterized by search 
frictions. .  Furthermore, comparing the median price (equation  (12) with θ  = 0.5) and the 
average in equation  (13), we notice that the mean exceeds the average.  This right skew makes 
sense.  Competition pushes the mass of offered insurance prices towards marginal cost.  Only 
relatively few sellers can profitably persist on the right tail of the offer distribution because there 
is only a relatively small chance that a buyer will have the misfortune that the high price is their 
best offer.  The greater the friction, the thicker this right tail becomes. 
A second implication concerns insurance turnover.  Changing health insurers can entail 
significant costs.   If market frictions were quite small (γ  close to zero) or, for that matter, quite 
large (γ  approaching infinity), the distribution of premiums would be narrow and gains from 
switching insurers would likely not exceed the switching costs.  From this perspective, the 
observation of high rates of turnover in insurance relationships is itself evidence for intermediate 
levels of market frictions.  Importantly, the churn predicted by the model is not merely a 
consequence of labor market turnover, which would be expected in any economy in which 
insurance is employer-provided.  Rather, we expect to see movement of entire employer groups 
as clients exit after having found a better deal at a competing insurer. 
Third, the model leads us to expect substantial marketing and sales expenditures.  Indeed, 
the model predicts an inefficiently large level of such expenditures.  To make this point we begin 
by substituting (8), (10), and (11) into (6) and write insurer profits as 
10 











=− ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
x  
Remembering that all insurers choose the same level of marketing activities, the profit 















Next, recall that our market has clients and c n f n insurers, and note that social surplus is 
R p c −  
for every client served minus the marketing and sales costs incurred by insurers:  
(16)  1( )
R
cf Sn p c n
δ
δλ
⎡⎤ =− −− ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
( ) . m x  
where the term in brackets is the proportion of clients with insurance.  Finally, then, we have 
surplus per client,  
(17)  () ( 1 / ) (






The socially optimal level of marketing, 














We have assumed that λ  is concave in  , so   X / X X λ λ <  , and that  is convex, so  () mx () mx ′  is 
increasing in x.  Thus the privately optimal level of marketing,  * x  from (15), exceeds the 
socially optimal level, 
e x from (18).  In equilibrium, insurers spend more on marketing and sales 
than is socially optimal.   
This finding has an intuitive interpretation.   In a frictional market, prices exceed 
marginal cost so insurers profit by attracting new clients.  Suppose that an insurer tries to attract 
new clients by increasing a marketing expenditure, such as side payments made to brokers.  The 
advantage gained by this additional marketing expense is negated when other insurers decide to 
do the same thing.  The result is an arms race in marketing.  Social welfare would be improved if 
fewer resources were devoted to marketing, but no insurer will make this choice on its own 




                                                
encourages all insurers to simultaneously reduce marketing, a point to which we return to in our 
policy discussion in Section 4.2. 
In short, our theory motivates an empirical assessment of commercial health insurance 
markets that focuses on three concerns: high policy turnover rates, the presence of price 
dispersion, and the existence of substantial marketing/sales costs.  In Section 1 we mentioned 
evidence about the large levels of marketing costs in U.S. insurance markets.  In the following 
section we turn to evidence about turnover and price dispersion.  
3. Evidence Concerning Insurance Turnover and Price Dispersion 
3.1. Turnover in Health Insurance Markets   
To document the level of insurance policy turnover, we start with data from the 
Household Survey component of the Community Tracking Study (CTS) conducted in four waves 
(1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01, and 2003) by the Center for Health System Change.  Importantly 
for our purposes, the CTS Household Survey collects information on insurance coverage that we 
can use to estimate annual cancellation rates for a representative sample of consumers.
18   
One drawback of the CTS is that data on insurance changes is reported retrospectively.  
This raises the potential for recall errors and, more importantly, complicates our ability to 
identify persons who cancelled a private insurance plan in the year prior to the interview date.  In 
practice, we identified a “cancellation” when (a) an individual reported a policy change or 
indicated the loss of insurance in the last year, and (b) reported “private plan” as their previous 
form of insurance.  We cannot know with certainty that all these subjects had private coverage 
one year prior to interview, though it seems a reasonable assumption.  “Non-cancellations” could 
be cleanly identified as those reporting current private coverage with no reported change in plans 
over the last year.  The ratio of cancelling subjects to the sum of non-cancelling and cancelling 
subjects provides our estimate for the one-year cancellation rate in private health plans.  
Two other limitations of the CTS are relevant.  First, in characterizing prior insurance 
type, the broad category “private plan” includes both group plans and “direct purchase” plans 
(those purchased in the non-group market).  As a result, we cannot specifically estimate the 
 
18  In the implementation of the survey, selected communities were over-sampled but weights were 
provided to construct national averages. 13 
 
cancellation rate for employer group health plans.  Second, even for current insurance type, the 
CTS does not distinguish between fully insured (FI) and self insured (SI) group plans. 
Our second source of data comes from the proprietary enrollment records of a large 
regional insurer.  Using these data we can observe cancellations directly from 2001 through 
2005.  Our cancellation rates are calculated as the fraction of members enrolled with the insurer 
on July 1st of a given year who cancelled their policy by July 1st of the subsequent year.  An 
important virtue of these data is that they allow us to distinguish between self insured and fully 
insured employer groups.  Unfortunately we do not know how representative this insurer is of the 
entire market.   
In Table 1 we present statistics on insurance cancellation rates.  Column (1) provides an 
estimate of the one-year cancellation rate for private health plans based on the CTS sample.  We 
find that 21% of respondents had private insurance within the previous 12 months and had 
cancelled that policy.  Of this 21%, 87% had acquired a new private policy at the time of the 
CTS interview, while 10% were uninsured.  
An alternative measure of insurance turnover, the one-year persistence rate, is presented 
in columns (2) and (3).  Persistence rates are the fraction of current policyholders who report 
having the same plan for at least one year.  The virtue of this measure is that the CTS 
distinguishes between group and non-group private plans for current insurance holdings.  As 
expected, the measured persistence rate is roughly 1 minus the cancellation rate.  More 
importantly, our measure of persistence is essentially unchanged when we exclude private 
policyholders in non-group plans, which suggests our CTS measure of the cancellation rate is not 
substantially affected by the inclusion of persons in non-group plans.  
Column (4) of Table 1 presents the aggregate cancellation rate of our regional insurer for 
policyholders in employer groups containing at least 10 members.  The one-year cancellation 
rate is nearly identical to that measured from the CTS. The aggregate cancellation rate, however, 
masks important heterogeneity among employer groups.  As reported in columns (5) and (6), 
cancellation rates for the regional insurer are more than twice as high for policyholders in fully 
insured groups (31%) than for those in self insured groups (14%).   
In Table 2 we provide estimates of the cancellation rate for various years.  Cancellation 
rates calculated from the CTS hover between 20 and 21% for each of the four waves of the 14 
 
                                                
survey, while cancellation rates for our insurer are somewhat more variable over time.  Again we 
note that FI employer groups have much higher cancellation rates than SI groups for each year. 
Our analysis of insurance market frictions highlighted the exit of entire employer groups 
from insurance relationships.  Table 3 presents estimates of the proportion of cancellations due to 
the exit of entire employer groups from one insurer to another.  In the Community Tracking 
Study we identify a cancellation by the employer group if the respondent indicated that the 
reason for the insurance cancellation was a change in the health plan offerings of one’s 
employer.  In the data from the regional insurer, we identify employer group cancellations based 
on the aggregate cancellation rate for the group and the cancellation codes present in the 
administrative records.
19 
In the first column of Table 3 we provide information on the composition of cancellations 
in the CTS Household Survey.  As reported in the first row of column (1), 35% of those 
identified as exiting a private plan over the prior year cited as their reason for cancelling a 
change in employer group offerings, while 40% reported job loss or job change as the reason for 
cancellation.  These fractions are modestly lower than what we would expect if we could exclude 
persons in non-group plans, which comprise about 8% of all private policyholders in the CTS 
sample (based on the description of current policies).  Adjusting for the presence of non-group 
policyholders (see rows titled “adjusted fraction”), we find that about 38% of cancellations 
among group policyholders is due to employer group cancellations, while about 43% are due to 
employer groups changing their insurance offerings.  The remaining cancellations are primarily 
due to employees changing the plan they select among the employer’s menu of insurance options 
or employees switching to policies available through a spouse’s employer. 
The remaining columns of Table 3 report estimates based on data from our regional 
insurer.  In column (2), we estimate that roughly half of all cancellations are the result of 
 
19  Specifically, we defined employer cancellations as occurring when at least 90% of the group’s 
members were observed to cancel in a year or if at least 80% of members cancelled with at least one 
“group cancellation code” recorded in the insurance company’s enrollment files.  Representatives of 
the insurer assisted in determining our rule for identifying group cancellations.  We could not rely on 
the reason for cancellation coded in the insurers’ records because most of these codes were non-
informative.  We likely failed to identify some group cancellations in cases where a large fraction of a 
cancelling group’s members took advantage of COBRA to continue their coverage.  Thus, our results 
are likely to under-estimate turnover.      15 
 
employer groups discontinuing their relationships with the regional insurer, a figure that is higher 
than the 38% found in the CTS Household Survey.  Some of this discrepancy may be due to the 
differences in the definition of “employer group cancellations” across the two data sets and the 
potential misreporting of cancellation reasons in the CTS.  Some of this difference, however, 
might also be due to particular pricing policies of our regional insurance company.  In a 
frictional insurance market, if the insurer offered policies with above average premiums, it would 
also experience higher than average employer group cancellation rates.  Columns (3) and (4) 
demonstrate that group cancellations are especially common among fully insured groups, 
comprising 59% of all cancellations compared with 38% for self insured groups. 
The results reported in Tables 1 though 3 indicate that annual cancellation rates are non-
trivial and, consistent with our model of insurance market frictions, a substantial fraction of this 
turnover is the result of entire employer groups exiting plans.  Turnover by entire employer 
groups is especially pronounced for fully insured groups, consistent with our premise that search 
frictions are mostly found in the fully insured market.    
In Table 4 we take the analysis a step further, using the data from the regional insurer to 
compare cancellation rates by employer size and insurance status (FI or SI).  Statistics in column 
1 of Table 4 demonstrate that annual cancellation rates are highest among smaller employer 
groups.  It is well known that worker turnover rates are higher among small employers (e.g., 
Brown and Medoff, 1989, and Rebitzer, 1986) but the results in column (2) suggest that this is 
not the primary cause of higher cancellation rates in smaller employer groups.  Instead, the 
differences appear mostly due to differences in the cancellation rate of entire employer groups.   
Columns (3) through (6) of Table 4 report similar statistics separately for SI and FI 
employer groups.  The general pattern from columns (1) and (2) holds: cancellation rates fall as 
firm size increases and substantial portions of this turnover are due to employer group exits 
rather than labor market mobility.  We also find that overall cancellation rates, as well as 
cancellations due to the exit of entire employer groups, are markedly higher among the FI groups 
within any given firm size category.  Among groups with fewer than 1000 members, the 
difference in aggregate cancellation rates across SI and FI employer groups is driven primarily 
by the difference in group cancellation rates. 16 
 
                                                
In Section 4 below we argue that high turnover rates reduce private incentives to invest in 
future health.  Many of those investments, especially those relating to the management of chronic 
disease, are best made in middle age or later.  In Table 5 we therefore present cancellation rates 
by age.  For both the CTS sample and our regional insurer, cancellation rates are highest among 
younger policyholders, but even in the oldest age category, turnover rates are substantial—
approximately 15% per year.  For older policyholders, group cancellations account for a 
particularly large fraction of all cancellations.  This is especially true among older members in 
fully insured groups.  For our regional insurer, these policyholders have cancellation rates of 
almost 25%, two-thirds of which is attributable to employer group cancellations.     
  In sum, we find that there is substantial health insurance turnover, much of it due to 
group-level cancellations.  Turnover is more than twice as high in fully insured (FI) group plans 
than in self insuring (SI) group plans.  This latter difference is due almost entirely to higher rates 
of group-level turnover in FI plans.  This pattern is what we would expect if the market for fully 
insured employer groups had significant search frictions while the market for self insured 
employer groups did not. 
3.2. Price Dispersion in the Health Insurance Market 
  We turn now to evidence on price dispersion drawing on the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS).  In this section we compare the empirical 
distribution of group insurance premiums to features of the distribution predicted by our search 
model.  Specifically, we investigate whether the FI market segment (where frictions are most 
important) has more unexplained premium variation than the SI segment and whether this 
“excess price dispersion” in FI plans has the expected right skew.  In Section 3.3 we go further, 
making simple structural estimates of the underlying parameters of the search model. 
  Our analysis focuses on 5,261 establishments that offered a non-HMO plan as their 
dominant plan option when surveyed.
20  Table 6 provides a breakdown of these establishments 
by insurance type and FI/SI status.  Within this sample, the strongest predictor of SI status is firm 
size (see Table 7).  Among firms with 35 or fewer workers, only 2.5% of establishments offered 
SI plans, while SI plans dominate establishments within larger firms.  Our variable of interest is 
 
20  See the Data Appendix for detail on data exclusions. 17 
 
                                                
the “single monthly premium” recorded for the dominant plan at the surveyed establishment.  
For both FI and SI employers, the premium includes the contributions of employers and 
employers.  For SI insurers, the premium figure is best understood as approximating the expected 
no-load cost of insurance. 
In Table 8 we report the distribution of raw premiums within SI and FI group plans in our 
sample.  Mean premiums are nearly the same across SI and FI group plans, but the distribution of 
FI group premiums shows substantially higher variance and a more pronounced right skew.
21   
The greater premium variance observed in FI group plans is plausibly the result of search 
frictions, but could also result from greater heterogeneity in the expected costs associated with FI 
plans.  We therefore focus our attention on “residual premiums,” i.e., on the premium that is left 
unexplained by a premium regression estimated using a large number of control variables.   The 
premium prediction models were estimated via GLM using the log “link” function and gamma 
distributional family.
22  Separate regressions were run for FI and SI plans and both regressions 
included identical covariates measuring plan and establishment characteristics such as plan type 
(PPO/POS), deductible level, co-payment for typical office visit, the inclusion of prescription 
drug coverage; and establishment characteristics such as firm and establishment size, percent of 
workers who are full-time, percent female, age distribution of workers and mean payroll.  Details 
on these premium regressions are presented in the Data Appendix.   
Table 9 and Figure 1 present the distribution of premium residuals derived from premium 
prediction models estimated separately for FI and SI group plans.  The patterns in the data are 
what we would expect if there are search frictions in the market for FI group plans.  Even after 
conditioning on group and plan characteristics, the residual premium variance is much higher for 
 
21  We also find that mean premiums across SI and FI plans are similar after we control for plan/group 
characteristics under a variety of specifications. Ceteris paribus our model leads us to expect higher 
premiums in FI plans, but in comparing FI with SI plans all else is probably not equal.  Large 
employers, who tend to self insure, offer higher wages than smaller employers (Brown and Medoff, 
1989).  We would therefore expect SI plans to offer richer and more expensive insurance because 
health insurance is a normal good and because the tax breaks for health insurance are most valuable 
for high-income employees.  
22  Specification of the premium prediction model followed the advice presented in Manning and Mullahy 
( 2001) for the modeling of skewed health care cost distributions.  The link and distributional family 
assumptions were supported by the Box-Cox test and modified Part test.  See the Data Appendix for 
additional details and estimate results. 18 
 
FI plans than SI plans.  The included covariates explain a much smaller fraction of the original 
variance in premiums in FI group plans (about 20%) than for SI group plans (about 54%).  The 
distribution of residuals for FI group plans also has the predicted right skew not evident among 
SI group plans.  Table 10 gives calculations of the mean premium residual in different quintiles 
of the residual distribution.  Here again the results suggest that variation in premium residuals is 
larger for FI plans. 
The sample of FI firms contains more small employers than does the sample of SI firms.  
Small firms are of particular interest to our analysis because they are likely to face especially 
high per-employee costs of search.  It is nevertheless useful to see if our patterns persist for firms 
in size categories that are common to both the SI and FI samples.  In Table 11 we present 
residual variation comparisons by firm size and confirm our central result.  Residual variation is 
higher for FI than SI plans even among the medium-sized firms common to both the FI and SI 
samples.  
3.3. Estimating the Magnitude of Market Frictions in the Fully-Insured Market Segment 
As discussed above, the empirical distribution of premium residuals for FI and SI plans 
are consistent with the presence of search frictions in the FI segment of the market.  In this 
section, we fit the estimated distribution of FI premium residuals to the distribution implied by 
our model of search frictions in order to uncover parameters of the model.  Our estimate of 
search frictions will be exaggerated, however, if we fail to take into account the fact that the 
residual premiums in the FI market also include some “nuisance” variation of the sort found in 
most regression models. The challenge for our estimation procedure, then, is to appropriately 
adjust for the presence of “nuisance dispersion” in the distribution of estimated FI residuals.   
We begin by assuming that the residual premium observed for plan i , which we note as 
ri, is the sum of two underlying components: a frictional residual resulting from i’s place in the θ 
distribution, and an independent nuisance residual.  We model the nuisance residual as the result 
of draws from a mean zero normally distributed random variable with a standard deviation (σ), 
set to equal to the standard error of the premium residuals estimated for the self-insured plans.  
This approach is based on the reasonable assumptions that search frictions are negligible in the 
self-insured market segment and that the effect of unobservables in the SI market are similar to the FI market. Thus if Ei  is plan i’s position in the distribution of nuisance residuals, the value of 
the nuisance residual is given by 
(19)  () ()
2. ii i ee E E σ == Φ  
 Using equations (19) and (12) the distribution of adjusted premiums,  i p r + , can be 
written as a function of θi and Ei: 
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If Ei and θi were observed, we could simply search for the parameter values of c, γ, and p
R that 
allow equation (20) to best fit the data.  Unfortunately, Ei and θi are not observed, so instead we 
employ an iterative simulation procedure that utilizes inferred values for Ei and θi. 
Let κ denote each percentile point in the distribution of adjusted premiums.  In the first 
iteration, we assume that κi = Ei = θi.  In other words, each plan is initially assumed to occupy the 
same place in the distribution of nuisance residuals and the distribution of friction-induced 
residuals.  This assumption, while clearly false, allows us to get initial parameter estimates by 
fitting the following model via non linear least squares (NLLS):
 23 
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Using these initial parameter estimates, we then create a simulated distribution of 
premiums by taking 100,000 independent draws of Ei and θi and applying eq (20).  Ranking the 
simulated premiums by magnitude, we obtain values of E and θ at each percentile point in the 
distribution of simulated premiums, which we denote Eκ and θκ. 
In the second iteration, we use the values for Eκ and θκ to fit the following model using 
NLLS: 
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23  Our results are not sensitive to how we select starting values.  For example we get nearly identical 
results if we initialize the starting value of the nuisance residual to zero. The resulting parameter estimates are used to generate a new simulated distribution of premiums, 
and this new distribution yields new values for Eκ and θκ.  We fit these to equation (22) and 
obtain refined parameter values.  The parameter estimates presented below are based on 20 
iterations of this procedure, though the estimates largely “converge” after the 10-15
th iteration.
24 
Panel A of Table 12 presents the results of our structural estimation.  The baseline results 
are found in column (1).  The average cost of insurance, c, is estimated to be $136.4 per month in 
1997.   The search friction parameter,γ , is 0.152.  The maximum willingness to pay for 
insurance is estimated to be $433.9 per month.  Fully insured employers are typically smaller 
than self insured employers and if the premium determination process for small firms is 
inherently noisier than large firms, our use of the variance from the self-insured regression to 
estimate nuisance variation may understate the variance of e.  For this reason we present in 
column (2) a second set of estimates in which the standard deviation of the nuisance distribution 
is the standard deviation of the self insured premium residuals after the SI sample is reweighted 
to match the distribution of firm sizes in the fully insured sample.  This adjustment increases the 
variance of the nuisance residual by 11%.  Our estimates are not greatly changed, but do suggest 
modestly smaller search frictions.  Both sets of estimates predict a mean monthly premium of 
$175.7 (see equation 13), quite close to the mean observed in our data ($176.2).    
Panel B of Table 12 examines how closely the estimated model fits the empirical 
distribution of residuals.  Row one of this panel presents the average difference between the 
empirical distribution of residuals and a simulated distribution produced using the parameter 
estimates and assumed nuisance variance.  For model 1, the mean absolute deviation is $1.7 per 
month.  The mean squared distribution is also small (<10), indicating a close fit between the 
observed and predicted distribution of residuals.  For model 2, the mean absolute deviation is 
slightly higher ($2.6 per month) while the mean squared deviation is barely changed.  Figure 2 
and 3 plot the simulated and empirical distribution of residuals from models 1 and model 2 
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24  Due to randomness inherent in the simulations, parameter estimates do not strictly converge, but 
fluctuate within tight bounds after the 10-15
th iteration.  As a result, slightly different estimates are 
obtained each time the iterative simulation procedure is performed.  Reported estimates are those 
reflecting the median estimate of the friction parameter, γ, from 21 runs of the procedure.  21 
 
                                                
respectively.  These plots confirm the close concordance between the observed residuals and 
those predicted by the fitted search friction models.    
As a check on the plausibility of our results, we can compare our value of c to estimates 
derived from other data sources.  In 1997, total private insurer spending on personal health care 
was $320B, and 188 million persons were covered by private insurance at some point during the 
year (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002).  These numbers imply that insurers spent 
about $142 per member per month in 1997—within the 95% confidence intervals of each 
model’s estimate.
 25   We can similarly perform a rough check on our estimate of maximum 
willingness to pay, p
R .  As Hornstein, Krusell and Violante ( 2007) note, in frictional markets the 
maximum willingness to pay will equal the maximum observed premium so long as the efficacy 
of search for insurance is unrelated to current insurance status.
26  From this perspective, our 
model 1 estimate of p
R  = $433.9 seems reasonable as it lies about 5% above the premium at the 
99
th percentile of the adjusted distribution ($415.2).
27 
 
25  This estimate of c suggests that average premiums exceed costs in FI plans by 27%.  This seems 
reasonable.  In 1997 total premium payments ($359 billion) exceeded the total payouts of private 
insurers on enrollees’ health care ($320 billion) by about 12%, but this is aggregated over FI and SI 
plans (as well as non-group plans).  Taking into consideration that approximately 60% of enrollees in 
group plans are in SI plans, and assuming minimal excess overhead for these plans, we would expect 
the excess overhead aggregated over all plans to be roughly half as large as the overhead for FI plans 
exclusively.   These estimates are also not out of line with studies of other imperfectly competitive 
health-related insurance markets.   Brown and Finkelstein ( 2007), for example, estimate that in the 
market for long-term care insurance, policy holders receive $0.82 in benefits for every premium dollar 
spent.  Their result implies that the ratio of the discounted present value of premiums to the discounted 
present value of expenditures by insurers is 1.22.  
26  To understand this result, consider the Burdett-Mortensen model in its original labor market context.  
If it is more effective for workers to search when employed, then some employees will accept a wage 
less than their reservation wage in order to gain access to a more efficient search process.  In this case, 
the lowest observed wage will be less than the reservation wage.  Conversely, if it is more effective to 
search when one isn’t employed, some employees will pass up jobs with wages above reservation 
wages in order to gain access to more efficient search processes.  If job search is as efficient for 
employed and unemployed workers, the minimum observed wage is the reservation wage.  The 
analysis holds in our insurance context: if the efficiency of insurance search is independent of 
insurance status, then the maximum observed price is equal to p
R. 
27   Another check on our estimates is to compare the “frictional” uninsurance rate implied by our 
estimates with observed rates of uninsurance.   In the Burdett-Mortensen framework, the distribution 
of prices is bounded from above by employers’ maximum willingness to pay.  In the real world, of 
course, many employer groups don’t offer insurance because the price exceeds their reservation price.  
To the extent that “affordability” contributes uninsurance, we would expect our estimate to understate 
total rates of uninsurance – perhaps by substantial amounts.  Consistent with this expectation, our Our estimates suggest the presence of moderate search frictions, sufficient to create 
substantial distortions in insurance markets.  Estimates in model 1, for example, suggest that the 
monthly consumer surplus created by a health insurance policy is p
R – c = $297.5 per member 
per month.  This totals $3570 per member over a year.  From equation (13) we know that for the 
average group, the fraction of the surplus accruing to insurers in the form of higher prices is 
γ/(γ +1) or 13.2%.  Summing over the 73.1 million policy holders in the FI group health 
insurance market in 1997, the implied aggregate surplus transfer to insurers resulting from 
market frictions was $34.4 billion in 1997.
28 
We can similarly use our parameter estimates to analyze the distortions that search 
frictions introduce into insurance turnover rates.   Recall from section two that the endogenous 
group cancellation rate due to search is () Fp λ where F(p) is the rank of a firm’s premium in the 
distribution of premiums.  The exogenous cancellation rate is represented by parameter δ, so the 









.  Substituting 
our estimated parameter values and predicted mean premium into equation (10), we find that the 
average accepted offer sits at the 27
th percentile of the distribution of offers.
29  If  () Fp=0.27, 
and if γ takes the estimated value of 0.152, it follows that search frictions account for about 64% 
of group turnover for the average insurer in the fully insured market.   
4. Implications for Health Policy 
The empirical investigations reported in Section 3 indicate that search frictions in the 
fully insured segment of the health insurance market are sufficient to produce considerable 
                                                                                                                                                             
estimate of γ  implies a frictional uninsurance rate = 0.135, far less than the 41.7 percent of employers 
in the EHIS who report not offering health insurance in 1997.  
28  From Health, United States, 2002, we know the number of persons less than 65 who obtained health 
insurance through their workplace in 1997 was 155.6m (National Center for Health Statistics, 2002).  
We estimate that roughly 47% of covered workers were in fully insured plans in 1997 by averaging 
figures for 1996 and 1998 from The 1999 Annual Employer Health Benefits Survey (The Kaiser 
Family Foundation and Health Research Educational Trust, 1999).  This implies approximately 73.1m 
persons were in fully insured plans in 1997.  
22 
 
29  Because the distribution of accepted offers is right skewed, the mean of accepted offers sits at the 75
th 
percentile of the distribution of accepted offers. premium dispersion and insurance turnover.  These features of the market have important 
implications for public policy interventions designed to make health insurance more efficient and 
less costly. 
4.1. Investments in Future Health 
Inadequate preventive care, especially for those with chronic disease, is one of the most 
important quality failures in the U.S. health care system (Institute of Medicine Committee on 
Quality of Health Care in America,  2001).  McGlynn, et al. ( 2003) estimate that only 55% of 
adults receive recommended levels of preventive care, while adults with such chronic illnesses as 
diabetes, asthma, coronary artery disease, chronic obstructed pulmonary disorders, and 
hypertension  receive only 56% of the chronic care recommended by clinical guidelines.  The 
care of patients with chronic diseases accounts for 75% of annual health care expenditures 
(National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion 2005).  The 
complications associated with these conditions accumulate over time, so early interventions can 
improve patient care and reduce medical costs.  Excess turnover induced by search frictions 
shortens the expected duration of insurance relationships and therefore undermines insurers’ 
incentives to invest in preventive care and disease management.
30 
To understand the effects of heightened turnover, we return to the model outlined in 
Section 2.  Now, however, suppose that at the time a client enrolls, an insurance company makes 
a one-time investment I that reduces future health care costs.  Such investments might include 
any number of preventive measures.
31  We let the costs of providing insurance going forward be 
 a function that is increasing in  () , cI I and convex. 
To simplify we ignore potential improvements in patient health and welfare and focus 
attention only on cost savings accruing from investments in I.  The efficient level of investment,
e I , will be that level at which the marginal return equals the discount rate ()
e cI r ′ − = .  Consider, 
though, a firm operating in the frictional environment discussed in Section 2.  In this case 
                                                 
30  High rates of turnover can also add to the administrative burden of commercial health insurance, a 
point discussed in Cebul, et al. (2008). 
23 
 
31  In the case of diabetes, for instance, it might represent resources spent aiding patients to control 
hemoglobin A1c (HbA1c) and blood lipids.  See Beulieu, et al. ( 2007) for a discussion and reference 
to further literature. 24 
 
p
equilibrium price dispersion increases the chances that the insurance relationships will be 
severed and savings accrue to other insurers.  Thus in a fictional setting the firm discounts future 
cost savings according to () rF δ λ ++ , and so will choose 
* I  such that    
This implies that 
* () () . cI r Fp δλ ′ −= + +
* e I I <
G
 and firms will under-invest in preventative care. 
32  The extent of 
underinvestment will depend on that firm's place in the price distribution, . () Fp
33  
4.2. Public Insurance Competing in a Private Market 
In this section we consider a policy intervention that could reduce the distortions 
resulting from search frictions while leaving untouched the basic structure of insurance 
relationships in the private market.  The policy we analyze is a publicly financed insurance 
option that would act as a “backstop” for employer groups searching for insurance in the private 
sector. 
Let us suppose that, like any insurance provider, the government can provide insurance at 
cost c, and suppose that all clients are aware of the availability of this product.   The government, 
in this hypothesized intervention, will offer a very simple and easy to understand policy.  This 
simplicity, combined with the private sector’s superior skill and flexibility in tailoring policies to 
the needs of individual clients, reduces the utility of the government financed backstop product 
relative to that available in the private sector.  We capture this feature by setting the maximum 
willingness to pay for the government insurance policy below the reservation premium for the 
private sector, i.e. 
R p p <
)
.
34  The surplus created by enrolling in the government financed 
option is(
G p c − , which is obviously less than the surplus created by the private plan,()
R p c − .   
                                                 
32   The hypothesis that insurance turnover reduces investments in future health receives empirical support 
in recent studies by Herring ( 2006) and Fang and Gavazza ( 2007).  In addition to turnover, frictions 
reduce these investments by enabling insurers to capture some of the surplus from investments in 
future health made by other insurers.  This rent transfer leads to underinvestment even when these 
investments are fully general and reduce costs at all insurers. (Acemoglu,  1997 makes the analogous 
point in his analysis of investments in general human capital.)  Indeed, rent transfer can lead to 
underinvestment in future health even when investments are financed by the patient and the returns 
accrue to the patient in the form of improved health. 
33  That friction induced price dispersion generates variation along non-price dimensions has been 
discussed in the literature on labor market search (e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000, and Lang and 
Majumdar, 2004).   
34   Otherwise, it would make sense to simply have publicly-provided insurance to all clients. Welfare analysis of this policy is quite easy.  If the publicly financed insurance policy is 
taken up by those who do not find insurance in the private sector, surplus per client is   
(19)  () () ( 1 / ) (









is the steady state fraction of clients finding private sector insurance, 
δ
δ λ +
 is the 
fraction taking up the government fallback policy, and ( ) 1( NmX )  is the per client cost of 
marketing.    
From our analysis above, we already know that the market-driven level of X is 
inefficiently high; an arms race exits which leads to excessive marketing costs across all firms.  















The first term on the right hand side is the marginal benefit from increased marketing 
expenditures.  These gains result from an increase in the number of clients who adopt private 
plans times the greater willingness to pay for these plans,
RG p p − .  These benefits must be 
evaluated against the marginal costs arising from increased marketing activity.  These costs are 
expressed in the second term on the right hand side of (24).  The socially optimal level of 
marketing occurs when (24)  is 0, i.e., at the level 













The government can influence X by the way it chooses to price the public insurance 
option.  Suppose the government sells its insurance product at price   (which obviously must 
be less than maximum willingness to pay,
*
G p
G p ).  Purchasers can then either buy insurance from 
the government and gain , or accept a better offer from the private sector if they can find 




H p , with  .
* ()
H RG p pp =− <
R
G − pp   This reduction in maximum price reduces 
incentives to market for all insurers.  This is easy to see from equation (15).  Substituting 
H p  for
R p , we see that each insurer will choose an optimal level of marketing 
* x that solves 
25 














Policy makers choose   to maximize social surplus, so that the left hand side of (25) 




* [( ) ( )] [ ].
RG RG
GX pp pc pp
X
λ
λ −+− = − 
 Since  X X
λ
λ >  (by concavity), (24) implies that
* 0 G pc − < .  The socially optimal government 
policy is to price the public insurance backstop option below cost!  Note that this policy will not 
completely crowd out private insurance, as privately-provided insurance is more highly valued 
than government-provided insurance.  Indeed the size of the optimal subsidy is limited by the 
welfare costs of attracting clients away from superior private options.  Rather, the intervention 
displaces insurance offerings on the far right tail of the distribution, i.e., the highest-priced 
policies, and in so doing makes the market more efficient.   
A subsidized government plan has ripple effects that alter incentives and prices 
throughout the market.  A properly chosen backstop plan improves market efficiency by 
moderating the arms race in marketing.  More precisely, equation (27) states that the subsidy 
reduces the payoff to marketing for all insurers; thus each insurer can spend less without ceding 
an advantage to competitors.  The government subsidized insurance also makes private insurance 
more attractive to consumers by compressing the distribution of prices towards marginal cost.  
5. Conclusion 
We have argued that search frictions distort commercial health insurance markets in ways 
that both increase the cost of health care to consumers and reduce care quality along some 
important dimensions.  Frictions increase the cost of insurance by enabling insurers to set price 
above marginal cost and by creating incentives for inefficiently high levels of marketing.  
Frictions also lead to price dispersion for identical products and to an increased rate of insurance 
turnover.  Our empirical findings indicate that frictions are a problem for the fully insured health 
insurance market.  We find evidence consistent with the presence of moderate frictions but these 
are nevertheless sufficient to create important market distortions.  We estimate that frictions 




                                                
(approximate $34.4 billion in 1997), and to increase employer group turnover 64% for the 
average insurance plan.  Heightened turnover likely reduces insurer incentives to manage chronic 
disease via investment in the future health of their policy holders. 
Our analysis of search frictions also addresses an important question raised in the current 
debate on health care reform: What is the point of having a public insurance option?  Proponents 
of a public option argue that it will serve to “discipline” the private market, but such discipline is 
unnecessary if insurance is sold in conventional competitive markets.  Things are different, 
however, if insurance markets have significant frictions.  In this case an appropriately subsidized 
public insurance option can improve efficiency by moderating incentives for excessive 
marketing expenditures.  A public option can also make private markets more attractive by 
displacing the relatively small number of policies on the far right tail of the distribution of 
premiums.  Eliminating this tail has ripple effects that can reduce insurance prices throughout the 
price distribution.  
Our analysis of frictions further suggests that an effective public option would be a 
simple, well-marketed and subsidized backstop policy that employers can choose if they don’t 
find something they like better.  Of course these conclusions emerge from a very stylized model 
and care should be taken in using them as a guide for policy.
35   
Ours is the first paper to estimate the magnitude of search frictions in health insurance 
markets, and it is clearly important for future work to replicate our findings with premium data 
and turnover data taken from other sources and other years.  There is also considerable variation 
across states and over time in the rules governing the rate setting practices of health insurers in 
the small group market  (Hall, 2000b).  Future work could exploit this variation to better 
understand the determinants of market frictions.  Confidence in our results would also be 
increased by empirical tests of ancillary predictions of our model.  The most important of these 
predictions is that investments in future health are influenced by the expected tenure of the 
relationship between the insurer and policyholder. 
 
35  A more complete policy analysis would also consider the distortions created by the taxes required to 
finance the public insurance subsidy as well as the policy’s own marketing and administrative costs.  
Other political considerations, such as whether the government will indeed choose the subsidy level 
that maximizes surplus, lie outside our analysis.  28 
 
                                                
Assessing the impact of search frictions in insurance requires a better understanding of 
their underlying causes.  In our introduction we emphasize the limited ability of small and 
medium-sized employers to compare the price and quality of the bewildering variety of complex 
health insurance policies.  This “information overload” mechanism matches nicely with some of 
the institutional features of the fully insured health insurance market (a very large number of 
complex competing insurance products, heavy reliance on brokers who receive payments from 
insurers, significant marketing costs for insurers, etc.) but it is not the only possible source of 
frictions consistent with our analysis.  Frictions might also result from the various state-level 
regulations that limit entry into the market and also distort pricing and the provision of product 
variety in health insurance markets (Hall, 2000b).
36  Still a third source might be adverse 
selection that gives an employer group’s incumbent insurers an advantage over outside rivals.   
Each of these possible causes of frictions has distinct implications for improving the 
functioning of health insurance markets. If the primary cause of frictions lies with the cognitive 
limitations of purchasers, outcomes might be improved by implementing more effective ways to 
disseminate information about the true price and quality of health insurance.
37  A simple 
backstop public insurance option of the sort mentioned above might also be helpful in this regard 
because it reduces the number of high price options available and thus allows purchasers to use 
their limited “mental shelf-space” to seek out more desirable options. 
 If state regulations are an important source of frictions, improvements might be best 
achieved by thoughtful pruning of the thicket of state and Federal rules governing insurance 
markets—especially for small and medium-sized employers.  Finally, if the ultimate source of 
frictions is adverse selection, attention must be devoted to new ways of creating risk pools so as 
 
36   For example, laws assuring guaranteed renewability of insurance can lead to excess product variety 
(and associated search frictions) because insurers are not permitted to close out an old product unless 
it is willing to transfer the existing subscribers into a new and similar product.  Under these 
circumstances, insurers keep old products on the books even if they cover a small number of persons 
(Mark Hall, personal communication). 
37  Thaler and Sunstein ( 2008) describe a number of possible methods to reduce the information burden 
of searching for health insurance.  Their discussion is in the context of Medicare Part D, but is 
applicable to many other health insurance settings. 29 
 
                                                
to mitigate this problem.  Specifically individuals might be placed into large pools in ways that 
are unrelated to health risk (Hall, 2008).
38      
Understanding the relative importance of various sources of frictions is also important 
because policies best suited to reduce one type of friction might worsen other types.  Consider, 
for example, a policy to “open up” state insurance markets to nationwide competition.   In 
principal this could increase the flow of offers to employers, thereby reducing the price of 
insurance.  But in a search model, an increase in the number of insurers need not lead to lower 
prices if it does not reduce the cost to insurers of marketing and medical underwriting or reduce 
the cost to employer groups of evaluating offers.
39  Indeed, this sort of proposal might exacerbate 
frictions resulting from information overload.   
Health insurance reform is among the most pressing policy issues in the United States 
today.  A better understanding of the causes and consequences of search frictions will be 
important for formulating better policy and improving the efficiency of insurance markets.   
 
 
38  Diamond ( 1992), and Emanual and Fuchs ( 2005), sketch ambitious and far-reaching reform proposals 
along these lines. 
39  Lang and Rosenthal ( 1991) provide a nice example that illustrates this point.  In their model, 
contractors bid on a project (in much the same way insurers might bid to be the policy provider for an 
employer group).  The winning bid in their zero-expected-profit equilibrium is rising in the number of 
bidders.     Table 1. Annual Cancellation Rates for Privately Insured Individuals 
 
 Community  Tracking  Study 
All waves (1996-2003) 










































NO NO YES  YES YES YES 
N 60,316  60,770  56,170  1,601,199  936,532  664,667 
 
Note: Author calculations from the CTS and enrollment records of a private insurer.    
The CTS sample includes household heads aged 23-65 at interview.  Cancellation Rate is defined as the 
fraction of persons with private insurance 12 months prior to interview who cancelled that policy by the 
time of the interview.  Persistence Rate is defined as the fraction of persons with a currently active private 
policy (at interview) with no reported change in insurance within the last 12 months.  Column (3) restricts 
the sample to private policyholders (at interview) with insurance through their employer.  Results are 
weighted to be nationally representative. 
The sample for the regional private insurer is primary policyholders aged 22-64 with an active policy at 
July 1
st of a given year (2001-2004).  The sample is limited to members of employer groups having at 
least 10 members.  Cancellation Rate is defined as the fraction who cancelled their policy by July 1
st of 
the subsequent year.  Individual members are potentially represented up to four times. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Table 2.  Annual Cancellation Rates over Time 
 
Community Tracking Study 
 

































































Notes: Author calculations from CTS data and enrollment records of a private insurer.  Samples are as 
defined as in Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  



















Fraction of Cancellation Rate 










Adjusted Fraction  .381  n/a  n/a  n/a 
       
Fraction of Cancellation Rate 
due to job loss/change 
.401 
(.007) 
n/a n/a  n/a 
Adjusted Fraction  .434  n/a  n/a  n/a 
 
Notes: Author calculations from CTS data and enrollment records of a private insurer.  See Table 1 for 
samples.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
In the CTS results, we attribute cancellations to employer group if the respondent indicated that the 
reason for the cancellation was “employer group changed offerings” (for those insured at interview) or 
“employer stopped offering coverage” (for those uninsured at interview).  We attribute cancellations to 
job loss/change if the respondent indicated that the reason for the cancellation was “own/spouse job 
change” (for those insured at interview) or “lost job/change employers,” “spouse/parent lost/changed 
job,” or “became part time/temporary” (for those uninsured at interview).  In each case, the adjusted 
fraction provides an estimate of the fraction of cancellations attributed to each cause if the sample were 
restricted to those with employer group coverage, by dividing the unadjusted fraction by the (weighted) 
fraction of currently private-insured persons who receive insurance through their employer (.920).   
For regional insurer results, we attribute cancellations to employer group if ≥90% of group members 
exited plan in year, or if ≥80% of group members exited plan in year with at least one member having an 
assigned cancel code indicative of group cancellation.  (Strict reliance on the assigned cancellation codes 
was not feasible since most were system-generated and non-informative.)  The fraction of cancellations 
attributed to employer group cancellation is not strictly comparable across samples because group 
cancellations resulting from an employer going out of business are attributed to job loss/change in the 
CTS results, but attributed to employer group cancellation in the regional insurer results.   
 
  
Table 4. Annual Cancellation Rates by Employer Group Size for the Regional Private Insurer 
 



























































































Notes: Author calculations from enrollment records of a private insurer.  Employer Group Cancellation Rate is defined as fraction of members (as 
of July 1
st in a given year) in groups that cancelled coverage by July 1
st of the subsequent year.  Group cancellations are identified as in Table 3. 
 
  
Table 5. Annual Cancellation Rates by Age 
 
  CTS Household Survey 
All waves 
Regional Private Insurer 
2001-2005 


















































































































Notes: Author calculations from CTS and private regional insurer.   For the CTS, age reflects the person’s age one year prior to interview (i.e., age 
at “baseline” from which cancellation rates are measured).  In columns 2 and 3, bracketed term represents an adjusted estimate of cause-specific 
cancellation rates under hypothetical restriction to persons with employer group coverage (see Table 3). Group cancellations are identified as 
described in Table 3.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Table 6.  Fully Insured (FI) and Self Insured (SI) Status by Plan Type 
 
 Establishment  Counts 
Plan Type  FI Plans  SI Plans 
Indemnity 841  284 
PPO/POS 3446  690 
 
Note: Author calculations from EHIS data.  See Data Appendix for details.   
 Table 7.  Fully Insured (FI) and Self Insured (SI) Status by Firm Size 
 
 Establishment  Counts 
Firm Size  FI Plans  SI Plans 
<10 1128    25 
10-35 1429    40 
35-250 1268  201 
250-5000   374  453 
≥5000     88  255 
 
Notes: Author calculations from EHIS data.
 Table 8.  Raw Distribution of Single Monthly Premiums 
 
Percentile  FI Group Plans  SI Group Plans 
 1%       $55.70 $60.00 
 5%             85.00 97.00 
10%            100.00 107.80 
25%          122.50 138.20 
50%            158.00 163.00 
75%            201.00 207.00 
90%            275.00 250.00 
95%       333.30 278.00 
99%            452.00 350.00 
   
Mean  176.2 177.7 
Variance  6418.2 3741.4 
Skew  1.67 0.87 
N (count)  4287 974 
 
Notes: Author calculations from EHIS data.  Weights applied to provide nationally-representative 
estimates.  
  
Table 9.  Distribution of Premium Residuals 
 
Percentile  FI Group Plans  SI Group Plans 
 1%       -134 -113 
 5%             -94 -72 
10%            -72 -45 
25%          -44 -18 
50%            -11 -1 
75%            28 18 
90%            84 47 
95%       138 59 
99%            239 136 
    
Mean  -.06 0.11 
Variance  5156.1 1736.0 
Skew  1.48 0.32 
N (count)  4287 974 
 
Notes: Author calculations from EHIS data.  Residuals obtained from premium prediction models 
reported in Table A1 (columns 1 and 2).  Weights applied to provide nationally-representative 
estimates. 
 Table 10.  Mean Premium Residuals across the Residual Distribution, FI and SI Plans 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Mean  Residual 
Quintile Range  FI Group Plans  SI Group Plans 

























Note: Author calculations from EHIS data.  These are the mean premium residuals over different 
ranges of the residual distribution, with premium residuals estimated from the GLM premium 
prediction models (estimated separately for FI and SI plans).  Bootstrap standard errors, with 300 
replications, are presented in parentheses. 
  
 Table 11.  Mean Premium Residuals across the Residual Distribution, by Firm Size 
 
  Mean Residual 
Firm size  0-35  35-250  250-5000  5000+ 



















           
0-20% -83.2 
(3.7) 






































































                
N (sample)  2557  65  1268  201  374  453  88  255 
 
Notes: Author calculations from EHIS data.  Details are as in Table 10, but models were 
estimated (and mean residuals calculated) by firm size categories.  Results omitted for categories 







 Table 12.  Estimates of Market Frictions and Insurance Cost for Fully Insured Employers 



























Notes:  Panel A reports parameter estimates from the procedure described in text.  
Estimates are based on 20 iterations.  Model 1 assumes nuisance residuals follow the 
distribution N(0,σ
2) where σ
2 = 1736.0, the variance in premium residuals estimated over 
self-insured plans (Table A1, Model 2).  Model 2 assumes nuisance residuals follow the 
distribution N(0,σ
2) where σ
2 =2140.8, the variance in premium residuals estimated over 
self-insured plans re-weighted so that the firm size distribution matches that of fully 
insured plans.  Similar estimates are obtained if we drop the normality assumptions and 
assume that the nuisance residual follows the exact distribution of residual premiums 
estimated over the self-insured.  Numbers in () are bootstrapped standard errors estimated 
over 200 iterations.  
Panel B presents “goodness-of-fit” measures based on comparisons of the 
estimated distribution of FI premium residuals and a simulated distribution of 100,000 
premiums reflecting the estimated parameters and model assumptions.  These measures 
were calculated based on the deviations observed at each percentile point across the two 
distributions.   
 
  
 Data Appendix 
1.  Data Selection Criteria 
The premium data are obtained from the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS).  The dataset consists of a stratified sample of 
establishments.  Throughout our analysis, the “establishment” is treated as the unit of 
analysis.  Sampling “establishment weights” provided in the EHIS dataset are used 
throughout the analysis to provide nationally representative estimates.   
  The following describes the selection criteria applied to construct the analytic 
sample:  
•  Private establishments offering at least one general medical plan 
(N=13,716). 
•  Restricted to establishments with at least 3 permanent employees 
(N=12,840).  This was done because the characteristics of workers in the 
establishment were constructed over permanent employees only, and the 
characteristics of permanent employees were found to be strongly 
predictive premiums. 
•  Restricted to establishments with a single “dominant” health plan, that 
covered both inpatient and outpatient services (N=10,391).  We defined a 
health plan as dominant when at least 90% of health plan enrollees from 
an establishment were enrolled in the same general medical plan.  In the 
premium prediction models, the plan characteristics used as covariates 
were those associated with the dominant plan for that establishment.   
•  Restricted to establishments where funding of the dominant plan was 
recorded as either “fully insured” or “self insured” (N=10,329).    
•  Restricted to establishments where the single monthly premium recorded 
for the dominant plan was not imputed (N=7,578). 
•  Excluded establishments if the dominant plan was an HMO plan 
(N=5,261).  HMO plans were excluded for two reasons.  First, fewer than 
5% of all HMO plans were self insured, compared with 17% of 
PPO/POS plans and 25% of indemnity plans.  Second, premiums for 
HMO plans are expected to vary for reasons not well-captured by the 
recorded plan characteristics.  
The application of these selection criteria yielded a sample of 5261 establishments 
offering a non-HMO plan as their dominant plan option.  The variable of interest in the 
subsequent analysis was the single monthly premium recorded for the establishment’s 
dominant plan.  An alternative premium measure – the family monthly premium – was 
not recorded as frequently, specifically not in cases where a family plan was not offered 
by the employer. 
 
2. Covariates Used in the Premium Prediction Models   
  The same covariates were included in the two premium prediction models, with 
the exception of three covariates that were not applicable to self insured establishments. 
  
•  Plan characteristics: 
o  plan type is PPO/POS (indicator) 
o  must enroll with gatekeeper (indicator, applies to PPO/POS plans 
only) 
o  deductible level (quadratic) 
o  copayment for typical office visit (quadratic, in some cases 
inferred by EHIS on basis of reported coinsurance level) 
o  any catastrophic cap (indicator) 
o  catastrophic cap level 
o  includes prescription drug coverage (indicator) 
o  includes mental health coverage (indicator) 
o  includes vision care coverage (indicator) 
o  includes dental coverage (indicator) 
o  includes coverage for preventive dental care and orthodontics 
(indicator) 
o  family coverage option available (indicator) 
o  no exclusions for health reasons (indicator) 
o  enrollees must report medical history (indicator) 
o  no waiting period for enrollment (indictor) 
o  contract includes guaranteed renewal (indictor) 
o  contract include minimum participation requirement (indictor) 
 
•  Establishment characteristics: 
o  establishment size (5 categories) 
o  percent workers, permanent 
o  percent workers, full-time 
o  percent workers, female 
o  percent workers, age 30-39 
o  percent workers, age 40-49 
o  percent workers, age 50+ 
o  mean payroll per worker (quadratic) 
o  any union workers (indicator) 
o  firm size (5 categories)  
o  firm industry (7 categories, agriculture collapsed with 
construction due to small sample size)  
o  firm years in business (4 categories) 
o  establishment part of insurance purchasing coalition 
o  premium source (4 categories)
40 
o  state dummies 
                                                 
40 The source for the single monthly premium was identified as one of the following: (a) reported 
premium, (b) COBRA, (c) reported same premium for single and family premium, or (d) 
derived from aggregate paid premiums. 
 Appendix Table A1.  Premium Prediction Models 
 GLM    OLS 








A. Establishment characteristics        
Employee characteristics         
  fraction permanent  0.11  0.01  18.93  25.10 
 (0.08)  (0.14)  (14.70)  (22.81) 
  fraction full-time  0.05  -0.02  4.08  0.47 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (7.76)  (12.70) 
  fraction female  0.07  0.03  10.35  0.18 
 (0.04)  (0.08)  (7.70)  (13.71) 
  fraction age 30-39  0.04  0.06  5.52  4.10 
 (0.05)  (0.07)  (9.84)  (12.10) 
  fraction age 40-49  0.25  0.15  45.27  23.13 
 (0.07)**  (0.06)*  (12.96)**  (11.96)+ 
  fraction age 50+  0.36  0.06  61.43  7.56 
 (0.07)**  (0.09)  (12.56)**  (16.85) 
  mean annual pay (/10
5) 0.24  -0.17  39.53  -26.18 
 (0.09)*  (0.10)+  (19.90)+  (20.31) 
  mean annual pay sqrd (/10
10) -0.12  0.05  -19.16  4.04 
 (0.05)**  (0.05)  (9.69)+  (10.42) 
  any union employees  0.18  0.05  36.26  7.82 
 (0.04)**  (0.08)  (8.11)**  (14.48) 
Establishment size
a        
  8-20  0.00  0.06  -0.25  13.55 
 (0.02)  (0.04)  (3.82)  (8.24) 
  20-50  0.01  -0.13  -0.08  -26.25 
 (0.03)  (0.05)*  (4.70)  (10.92)* 
  50-300  -0.03  -0.08  -3.55  -12.58 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (8.50)  (11.94) 
  300+  -0.04  0.17  -8.69  36.01 
 (0.05)  (0.09)+  (9.27)  (20.62)+ 
Firm size
b        
  10-35  -0.03  0.22  -5.91  31.74 
 (0.03)  (0.14)  (4.94)  (22.63) 
  35-250  -0.03  0.15  -6.07  19.18 
 (0.03)  (0.11)  (5.34)  (20.10) 
  250-5000  -0.12  0.23  -24.10  35.74 
 (0.04)**  (0.10)*  (7.86)**  (15.91)* 
  5000+  -0.03  0.19  -2.45  28.76 
 (0.10)  (0.11)+  (17.13)  (17.44) 
Industry category
c        
  mining and manufacturing  0.00  -0.05  -0.78  -19.88 
 (0.04)  (0.08)  (7.16)  (16.35) 
  transportation/communications  -0.01  0.01  -3.77  -5.17 
 (0.05)  (0.08)  (8.68)  (17.73) 
  wholesale trade  0.07  -0.15  15.87  -35.15 
  (0.07)  (0.09)+  (15.23)  (21.09)+ 
  retail trade  0.02  -0.12  4.46  -26.06 
 (0.03)  (0.12)  (6.24)  (22.96) 
  finance/insurance/real estate  0.02  -0.09  2.56  -24.94 
 (0.03)  (0.08)  (4.91)  (15.76) 
  professional services  0.05  0.01  8.09  -8.65 
 (0.04)  (0.11)  (6.09)  (23.15) 
  other services  -0.02  0.05  -4.65  5.07 
 (0.04)  (0.09)  (8.08)  (17.18) 
Years in business
d        
  5-10 years  -0.03  -0.04  -4.03  -9.32 
 (0.06)  (0.08)  (12.03)  (14.49) 
  10-20 years  -0.00  0.07  -0.91  8.57 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (6.97)  (12.20) 
  20-50 years  0.01  0.10  1.22  16.49 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (7.49)  (10.31) 
  50+ years  0.06  0.07  11.60  7.39 
 (0.03)+  (0.08)  (6.89)+  (11.36) 
        
Establishment involved in a    









        
        
B. Plan characteristics        
Plan type         
  PPO plan  -0.02  0.07  -3.82  13.24 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (5.37)  (11.08) 
  PPO plan w/ gatekeeper -0.04  -0.08  -6.70  -12.66 
 (0.02)*  (0.07)  (3.85)+  (12.63) 
  Plan offers family coverage   0.06  -0.49  10.00  -121.18 
 (0.05)  (0.11)**  (9.04)  (25.01)** 
Cost sharing         
  deductible (/10
2) 0.00  -0.04  1.16  -8.45 
 (0.01)  (0.03)  (2.00)  (5.01)+ 
  deductible sqrd (/10
4) -0.00  0.00  -0.10  0.42 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.21)  (0.39) 
  copay level (/10)  -0.02  -0.02  -3.43  -4.77 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (7.40)  (13.61) 
  copay level sqrd (/10
2) -0.02  -0.00  -3.14  -0.11 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (2.50)  (2.74) 
  plan has catastrophic cap  0.10  0.14  17.84  25.99 
 (0.03)**  (0.06)*  (5.85)**  (10.88)* 
  catastrophic cap amount  -0.11  -0.01  -20.04  3.67 
 (0.09)  (0.22)  (18.27)  (37.81) 
Coverage included         
  outpatient prescription drugs  0.08  -0.04  12.87  -6.81 
 (0.03)*  (0.12)  (6.01)*  (20.80) 
  mental health services  -0.05  -0.18  -11.87  -24.27 
 (0.07)  (0.12)  (15.63)  (18.77) 
   vision care  0.00  0.04  1.65  7.12 
 (0.03)  (0.05)  (5.09)  (9.08) 
  any dental   0.05  -0.01  7.04  -0.96 
 (0.03)+  (0.04)  (5.14)  (7.80) 
  premium dental
e 0.11  0.09  22.39  15.25 
 (0.04)**  (0.07)  (7.53)**  (12.75) 
Coverage restrictions         
  any employees excluded because of  









  employees required to provide  






  no waiting period for coverage  0.01  -0.01  1.86  -2.10 
 (0.02)  (0.03)  (4.51)  (6.21) 
  contract for plan is guaranteed  






  contract includes minimum  






Basis for reported premium         
  COBRA  -0.09  0.03  -15.12  6.37 
 (0.07)  (0.03)  (13.88)  (6.59) 
  reported that single premium did  










  derived from aggregate paid  









        
State Fixed Effects  YES  YES  YES  YES 
        
R
2  -- --  .2015  .5304 
Sample size  4287 974  4287  974 
Premium mean  176.2 177.7  176.2  177.7 
Premium variance  6418.2 3741.4  6418.2  3741.4 
Residual premium variance  5156.1 1736.0  5124.8  1757.1 
Notes: Data is drawn from the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Employer Health 
Insurance Survey (EHIS). Sample consists of 5261 private establishments meeting the following 
criteria: at least 3 permanent employees at establishment; firm offers at least one general medical 
plan to employees at establishment; at least 90 percent of participating employees were enrolled 
in the same non-HMO plan (the establishment’s “dominant” health plan); and single plan 
premium was not imputed.  
  Dependent variable is single monthly premium recorded for establishment’s dominant 
plan. Plan characteristics refer to establishment’s dominant plan. Prediction model in columns 1 
and 2 are estimated using generalized linear model (GLM) with log link and gamma distributional 
family. Coefficients are interpreted as changes in the log of predicted premium. The distributional 
family was determined by way of the modified Park Test.  Prediction model in columns 3 and 4 
are estimated using linear OLS.  
  Establishment-level weights applied to produce nationally representative estimates. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by sampling strata (+ significant at 
10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%).   
a omitted category: <8 employees 
b omitted category: <10 employees 
  
c omitted category: construction, plus agriculture/fishing/forestry (one establishment) 
d omitted category: <5 years 
e dental coverage that includes both preventive and orthodontic services 
f omitted category: reported premium 










































Notes:  “FI” depicts the distribution of residuals from the premium prediction model estimated 
over fully-insured plans (Table A1, column 1).  “SI” depicts the analogous set of residuals from 
the premium prediction model estimated over self-insured plans (Table A1, column 2).   
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Notes: “Estimated residuals” depict the empirical distribution of residual premiums at each 
percentile for fully insured employers.  These were the residuals from the model estimated in 
Table A1, column 1.  “Simulated residuals” depict a simulated distribution of residual premiums, 
plotted at each percentile, based on a simulation of 100,000 premiums under assumptions and 
parameters estimates from model 1 in Table 12. 
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Notes: “Estimated residuals” depict the empirical distribution of residual premiums at each 
percentile for fully insured employers.  These were the residuals from the model estimated in 
Table A1, column 1.  “Simulated residuals” depict a simulated distribution of residual premiums, 
plotted as each percentile, based on a simulation of 100,000 premiums under assumptions and 
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